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successes that the author tells us the story
of Charlie; instead, McRaven is impressed
by the man’s humility and its effect on
those around him. He concludes the
chapter with the observation: “The power
of humility is that it brings us closer
together and the role of every hero is to
unite people, not divide them” (p. 25).
While I enjoyed and appreciated each of
the stories of heroic character told in a
lighthearted and conversational manner,
the great strength of the book is in the
author’s encouragement to activate the
heroic character that is within reach for
every person. He encourages the reader
to do one thing in the right direction
today, and he believes that the confidence
to take the next step will follow. Regardless of whether you feel yourself to be
courageous, he says, “Take just one step
forward. Just one” (p. 13). If our goal is to
instill hope in others, he says, “Find out
what you’re good at and give it to others”
(p. 115). If we want to lighten the burden
on others around us, he writes, “Find
your comedic voice and use your wit to
save those around you, to free them from
their sorrow, to give them joy, and to help
them see the humor in the darkest of
times” (p. 132). McRaven contends that
self-reflection followed by small, incremental steps is the key to the heroic life.
This is an ideal book for leaders of all
ranks. Senior leaders will appreciate
the wisdom and insight the author has
accrued throughout his career, but they
also will be inspired to be on the lookout
for heroic virtues in their subordinates.
Small-unit leaders will find these stories
memorable and easy to share with those
they supervise. The hopeful tone of the
book will encourage leaders who may
spend an inordinate amount of time
dealing with character defects in others
to focus on helping them develop heroic
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character. Finally, all will be challenged
to reflect on their own strengths and
weaknesses and seek out others whose
lives are marked by the hero code.
SCOTT CAUBLE

The Cambridge History of Warfare, ed. Geoffrey
Parker. 2nd ed. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge
Univ. Press, 2020. 608 pages. $99.99.

Shortly before the outbreak of World
War I, the Prusso-German general
Friedrich von Bernhardi (1849–1930)
published his best-selling Deutschland
und der nächste Krieg (1911). Bernhardi,
the long-serving military historian of the
German General Staff, understood war
to be something far more elemental than
Clausewitz’s famous “continuation of
politics by other means.” Drawing on fin
de siècle social Darwinist and ethnonationalist thought, Bernhardi argued
that war facilitated human development. War provided an opportunity to
rejuvenate the nation, the society, and
the race. This was an ancient notion, as
Bernhardi acknowledged by drawing on
the writings of Heraclitus of Ephesus:
“[W]ar is the father of all things.
The sages of antiquity long before
Darwin recognized this” (Bernhardi,
Deutschland und der nächste Krieg,
pp. 11–12). In Bernhardi’s view, the
development of a society occurred
within the forge of war—it created the
necessity to evolve or go extinct. The
manner in which a society prosecutes
war is, likewise, a representation of
that society. War, like politics, is both a
reflection of and a response to the form
and function of its governing society.
It is this dynamic that the contributors
to the second edition of The Cambridge
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History of Warfare explore fully in their
development of the concept of the
“Western way of war” (p. vii). The nine
contributors (among them Williamson
A. Murray and Peter Monsoor) of
the book’s eighteen chapters clearly
demonstrate that the Western way of war
consists of five principal elements that
reflect broader Western society: discipline, finance, technology, eclecticism,
and an aggressive military tradition. The
most important of these are discipline
and finance—elements that allowed for
the nearly perpetual prosecution of war
through the massed mobilization of society. It is this “natural state” of Western
civilization, from the Early Bronze Age
onward, that facilitated the primacy
of the Western way of war today (p. vii).
This perpetual struggle militarized the
Western state, while simultaneously the Western state bureaucratized
and centralized Western warfare.

lords, wealthy merchant cities, or
mercenary bands. This led to a “startling
continuity” of military organization,
strategy, and tactics in the West until
the advent of gunpowder (p. 63). The
decentralized nature of the state
further made the pursuance of “total
victory” impossible, so warfare likewise
returned to its “positional” version,
like that prosecuted during the Bronze
Age: harvest-dependent campaigns of
sieges and countersieges against fortified
population centers. Even when the
central state gained an overwhelming
share of internal political and economic
power under Europe’s divine-right
monarchies epitomized by Louis XIV
(1638–1715), the nature of positional
warfare changed little. Limited, positional war—albeit dynastic and enhanced
with gunpowder—continued to dictate
the military organization, strategy, and
tactics of the early modern period.

Gradually, as ancient Western society
shifted toward oligarchic political
structures and the centralized socioeconomic power relations of the latifundia,
so too did the “limited wars” of the
hoplite yeomanry of the Greek polis
give way to the “wars of annihilation”
of Rome’s imperial legions—what
Victor Davis Hanson describes as the
“the perfect culmination of existing
Western military prowess” (pp. 5, 46).
Yet this development simultaneously
laid the seeds of feudal decentralization,
as the ability to mobilize society for
war increasingly detached from the
central state and coalesced around
ambitious individuals on the periphery.

This dynamic shifted dramatically with
the revolutionary ethno-nationalism
of post-Revolution France. Under
Napoléon, the nation became the army
and the army the nation. The superiority
of the “nation in arms,” of the massed
mobilization of an entire society against
the old dynastic form, was confirmed
(p. 147). The Western state and its
corresponding way of war now broke
out from its late antiquity bounds,
creating a perfect storm of technological
innovation, ethno-nationalist discipline,
and national mobilization of resources.
Correspondingly, between 1815 and
1914 the Western way of war subjugated
the near entirety of the globe to Western
political hegemony. Despite subsequent
evolutions from positional to maneuver
to nuclear warfare over the twentieth
century, the primacy of the Western way
of war—uniting discipline, finance, technology, eclecticism, and an aggressive

From late antiquity to the early modern
period, the ability of the central state
to marshal its domain for war relied
on negotiating power relationships
with regional political elites—feudal
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military tradition—continued. Even as
the West’s global political and economic
hegemony erodes, the Western way
of war will continue to inform the
military organization, strategy, and
tactics of any would-be hegemon.
Ultimately, The Cambridge History of
Warfare is the most comprehensive
textbook treatment of Western
military history extant, and it serves
as the quintessential companion to
the Cambridge History of War series.
While it may be “open to the charge of
Eurocentrism,” there is no doubt that
the “Western way of war has become
dominant all over the world” (p. vii).
The volume includes twenty maps, a
helpful glossary, a detailed chronology, and an extensive bibliography.
No work on this subject can be truly
comprehensive, but readers will find this
edition to be a good resource providing
an overview of the Western way of war.
VIKTOR M. STOLL

Information Hunters: When Librarians, Soldiers,
and Spies Banded Together in World War II Europe, by Kathy Peiss. New York: Oxford Univ.
Press, 2020. 296 pages. $36.95.

The ultrasuccessful businessman Mark
Cuban stated in an interview that
“[i]nformation is power. Particularly
when the competition ignores the opportunity to do the same” (“Interview with
Scott McKenzie,” slushpile.net, 9 March
2006). This axiom is especially true during times of war, when information—no
matter the subject matter or level of
importance—can be made part of the
intelligence-gathering process. On today’s
battlefield, information warfare is one of
the many domains in which our military
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prepares to fight, and intelligence agencies use much open-source intelligence.
Kathy Peiss, in her book Information
Hunters: When Librarians, Soldiers,
and Spies Banded Together in World
War II Europe, examines the efforts of
U.S. librarians and archivists during
World War II. First they gathered
open-source intelligence, then gathered
and preserved books, manuscripts,
and other sources during the war and
postwar periods to enhance the holdings
of the Library of Congress and other
research collections across the nation.
This is not the typical subject matter for
Peiss, who usually studies the history of
gender and sexuality. The book started
when she began exploring the life of her
uncle Reuben Peiss, who was part of the
Library of Congress European Mission
(LCM), which started with the mission
of acquiring books and periodicals
for the library but shifted to one of
intelligence gathering. Peiss’s curiosity
regarding her family has resulted in
an exciting exploration of a mission
that was important during World War
II but still holds meaning today.
Peiss divides the book chronologically,
with chapters that correspond to different periods and relate the missions of
the various units and their masters who
collected the information. Peiss illustrates that, unlike the “Monuments Men”
who worked within the U.S. Army to
protect art and historic buildings, many
groups contributed to the protection and
gathering of books and other materials.
These ranged from the Library of Congress, the Interdepartmental Committee
for the Acquisition of Foreign Publications within the Office of Strategic
Services (the forerunner of the Central
Intelligence Agency), and military units
such as T-forces, to the Monuments Men
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